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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE ONE: Mr. Fuell failed to challenge the adequacy of the court's factual 
findings in the trial court. The statement on page 5 of the Appellant's Brief, "In order to 
evaluate the merit of appellant's first imputation argument, we must determine whether 
the trial court's decision to impute income was supported by adequate findings in 
light of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) [ §78B-12-203].. ." clearly demonstrates that 
upon appeal, Mr. Fuell intends to challenge the adequacy of the trial court's findings. 
In the recent case, State Ex Rel. K.F., 201 P.3d 985 (UT 2009) 2009 UT 4, the 
Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc. 2004 UT 72, fl56, 99 
P.3d 80, which held in ^59 that in order to preserve an adequacy of the findings issue 
for appeal, a party is required to challenge the adequacy of the court's factual findings 
in the trial court. In ^60, of that case, the Supreme Court stated that: 
The requirement that a party raise a challenge to the adequacy of the findings 
of fact at the trial court before the challenge may be heard on appeal does not 
conflict with rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
( a ) . . . Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
( b ) . . . When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without 
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)-(b) (emphasis added). 
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Clearly, rule 52 addresses sufficiency of the evidence challenges. In 438 Main 
Street, however, we addressed challenges to the adequacy of the detail in the 
findings of fact. There we stated that a plaintiff "waive[s] any argument 
regarding whether the district court's findings of fact were sufficiently detailed" 
when the plaintiff fails to challenge the detail, or adequacy, of the findings with 
the district court. 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72,1J56, 99 P.3d 801 
In this appeal, a review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Fuell has failed to 
take any action whatsoever at the trial court level to preserve the issue of adequacy of 
the factual findings. Accordingly, this Court must presume the factual findings are valid 
and reject Mr. Fuell's challenges as stated in his Issue #1. 
ISSUE TWO: Mr. Fuell has failed to marshal the relevant facts on appeal. "On 
appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's decision to 
"marshal" the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Hagan v. Hagan, 810 
P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 
1989) (citations omitted) 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure states: 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v. 
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 
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1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). 
In this appeal, a brief review of the trial transcript demonstrates that Mr. Fuell has 
neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings nor demonstrated 
that such findings are clearly erroneous, citing instead only the carefully selected 
evidence that supports the outcome he desires. Further, in his brief, Mr. Fuell has 
slanted his presentation of the evidence heard by the trial court and in some cases he 
has attempted to mislead this Court by completely ignoring in his argument the 
testimony given at trial even when it appears in his own brief. 
Accordingly, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence presented at trial and reject Mr. Fuell's challenge as stated in Issue #2. Mr. 
Fuell's complete failure to Marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's 
findings must be fatal to his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case History 
On August 6, 2007 Lorencita Diel filed her petition to modify the divorce decree 
asking the court to (1) modify the existing joint physical custody award to award her the 
primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children; (2) modify the child support 
award to comport with the custody situation after modification; and (3) award her 
judgement for the $2,600.00 in child support Mr. Fuell had failed to pay her under the 
terms of the existing decree. (00049) At the time she filed the petition, Lorencita 
believed Mr. Fuell had received substantial pay increases since the time of the divorce 
that would also allow a modification of the existing $200.00 per month total child 
5 
support award for his three children because in his original complaint, Mr. Fuell had 
claimed that he made $3,500.00 per month gross (000091J7), even though his pay stub 
attached to the Findings and the Divorce Decree indicated he actually earned $4,009 
per month (000016 - Pay Stub Y-T-D income = $29,063 / 7.25 months as 8/05/03 pay 
period). 
On October 1, 2007, the parties were directed by the court to exchange a full 
accounting concerning the child support payments due and made. (00074) This issue 
was again before the Court on November 5, 2007. On April 18, 2008 Lorencita served 
upon Mr. Fuell several interrogatories and her requests for the production of documents 
concerning his employment and income status and parent time issues. (00082) This 
request was followed on June 11, 2008 by Lorencita's Motion to Compel Mr. Fuell's 
cooperation with discovery. (00091) On July 7, 2008 Lorencita's Motion to Compel was 
granted and Mr. Fuell was once again ordered to provide the requested financial 
information within 15 days. (00094) 
On September 29, 2008, this action was certified for trial to include Lorencita's 
issues of custody, her out-of-pocket medical expenses and insurance premiums, the 
$2,600.00 of past due child support and the modification of child support obligations 
beginning August 2007. 
Because Mr. Fuell had continued to refuse to provide the financial and parent 
time information as previously ordered several times, Lorencita was directed to file a 
Motion in Limine which she did on December 1, 2008. (00107) On December 15, 2008 
the court held a pretrial conference and once again ordered Mr. Fuell to provide his tax 
returns and pay stubs within 5 days and entered the order that other than the tax 
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returns and pay stubs Mr. Fuell would not be allowed to introduce any evidence that he 
had not previously produced at trial. (00155 Pg 6 Ln 18-22) 
On January 29, 2009 Lorencita filed and served Mr. Fuell with her Witness and 
Exhibit List. Mr. Fuell never did file any witness or exhibit lists prior to trial. (00155 Pg 7 
Ln 21 - Pg 8 Ln 5) The only relevant income information Lorencita ever received from 
Mr. Fuell was a single pay stub from his new job that arrived several days after the 
second pretrial conference held on December 15, 2008. 
Trial was conducted on February 4 and 11, 2009. The Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on March 5, 2009, and entered the Findings and final Order on 
March 30, 2009, from which this appeal was taken. (00146) 
It appears from the court record that Mr. Fuell's Notice of Appeal was not filed 
with the trial court and the fee was not paid until May 6, 2009. (00148) 
Trial Evidence 
At trial, Lorencita testified that Mr. Fuell had been ordered in the 2003 divorce 
decree to pay her $200.00 in monthly child support for the parties' three children (00155 
Pg 41 Ln 7 -10) and that at the time she served her petition to modify, Mr. Fuell was 
earning $4,825.00 per month at his job at EG&G as shown on his July 2008 pay stub. 
(00155Pg39Ln4 -11 f 19) 
At trial, Mr. Fuell testified that he had changed his job and began earning a lower 
amount of income 9 or 10 months after he had been served with Lorenciita's petition to 
modify the divorce. Mr. Fuell testified that as of July 13, 2008 his year to date pay stub 
from his job at EG&G indicated he had earned $31,366 (00155 Pg 126 Ln 7 - 1 2 ) which 
is equivalent to $4,823 per month average income. 
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Mr. Fuell stated that his change in employment reduced his income that he had 
historically been making from the $20.80 base pay plus night shift differential, Sunday 
premiums and eight hours of overtime every two weeks (00156 Pg 44 Ln 16- Pg 45 Ln 
2) to $14.00 per hour at his new job. (00156 Pg 46 Ln 4-7) 
Mr. Fuell responded to his attorney's question "So am I correct that you also 
changed your jobs because it was recommended by your doctor?" with the statement 
"They just recommended a lifestyle change" (00156 Pg 42 Ln 5-7) Mr. Fuell also 
stated that 7 changed jobs - - / didn't want to wait five years after I graduated to look for 
the employment that I took my school for and it had already been three years since I 
graduated, [from Heating and Air Gonditioning school] (00156 Pg 45 Ln 3-15) 
At the conclusion of trial, the court entered its Memorandum Decision that 
included the order to use $4,825 per month as Mr. Fuell's income for the calculation of 
the modified child support award. Mr. Fuell has appealed that order to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Fuell failed to comply with Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure thus denying this Court jurisdiction to hear or consider this appeal when he 
filed this appeal on May 6, 2009 which is more than 30 days after the final order was 
entered on March 30, 2009. 
Mr. Fuell stated the standard of review for his first issue to be "whether the trial 
court's decision to impute income was supported by adequate findings 
A review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Fuell has failed to take any action 
whatsoever at the trial court level to preserve the issue of adequacy of the factual 
findings. Because Mr. Fuell failed to preserve the issue of the adequacy of the factual 
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findings as required by the Supreme Court's ruling in 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, 
Inc., this Court must presume the trial court's factual findings are valid and the appeal 
of this issue must be denied. 
In his second issue, Mr. Fuell challenges sufficiency of the evidence used by the 
court to support its imputation of income. Mr. Fuell has failed to marshal the relevant 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous as required by Rule 52 of the URCP and by 
Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
At trial, Mr. Fuell did not allege that he had been fired or laid off and he produced 
no credible evidence to support any of his claims of medical problems that might have 
precluded his continued employment at this former job and income, thus the finding that 
his change in jobs had been voluntary was sufficiently supported by the evidence 
presented at trial. 
Mr, Fuell testified that at the time he was served the petition to modify, he had 
been historically making $20.80 base pay plus substantial premiums and overtime. He 
also testified that nine months after he was served the petition, he took a new job where 
his income was reduced to $14.00 per hour, thus the court's finding that his change in 
jobs had created an underemployment situation was sufficiently supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. 
Because the Appellant's brief failed to marshal the evidence as required by 
Rules 52 and 24, this Court must presume the trial court's factual findings are 
supported by sufficient and competent evidence, thus the appeal of this issue must be 
denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
Untimely Notice of Appeal 
After the Findings and final Order were entered on March 30, 2009, Mr. Fuell 
filed no motions that would extend the time to file an appeal. Therefore, pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a) Mr. Fueirs appeal from the final Order 
entered on March 30, 2009 must have been filed prior to the day it was filed on May 6, 
2009. Because Mr. Fuell failed to comply with Rule 4, this Court does not have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider this appeal which should therefore be dismissed. 
Imputed Income Not Pled 
On appeal, Lorencita Diel is charged with failing to ask for imputed income in her 
petition to modify and that she raised the issue of voluntary underemployment for the 
first time at trial. Because Mr. Fuell failed to marshal the evidence, the appellant's brief 
does not tell this Court that for the 15 months immediately preceding the trial, Mr. Fuell 
continuously refused to provide and actively resisted every effort by Lorencita to make 
him provide his income information so that child support could be properly calculated. 
The numerous motions and orders contained within the court record provides ample 
indication of Mr. Fuell's continuing refusal to participate in the trial preparation process 
for more than one year. Finally, after the court demanded it be turned over and just a 
few days before the beginning of trial, Lorencita did receive a single pay stub from Mr. 
Fuell. With that pay stub, she received the first evidence that Mr. Fuell's new job paid 
him significantly less than the job he held at the time she filed her petition. The next 
court appearance to occur after she finally did receive the information that Mr. Fuell had 
reduced his income by 50%, was the opening day of trial on February 4, 2009. 
10 
Contra to the claim in Mr. Fuell's brief, that there was error by the trial court 
because there was no claim for imputation of income stated in the petition to modify, 
the court made no error in imputing income simply because Mr. Fuell did not voluntarily 
end his historical job at his historical income until at least nine months after the petition 
to modify had been served upon him. (00156 Pg 81 Ln 1-11) 
Because the pretrial order from September 29, 2008 specifically listed child 
support obligations beginning August 2007 as an issue for trial (00111), Mr. Fuell's 
claim that the imputation of income was presented for the first time at trial while 
technically correct, is no basis for appeal simply because he created the situation by 
hiding his income from Lorencita until there were no more court appearances before 
trial started where she could make such a claim once his income was known to her. 
The trial court made no error in imputing income because it was Mr. Fuell that 
had refused to provide the information that established he had reduced his income until 
several days after the final pretrial hearing of December 15, 2008, which v/as the last 
court appearance before the trial began. (00115) 
The trial court did not allow Lorencita to engage in trial by ambush as claimed by 
Mr. Fuell. The record clearly shows that after Lorencita had provided Mr. Fuell all of her 
pertinent information without request, she was required to spend many months 
unsuccessfully trying to force Mr. Fuell to provide his basic information relevant to the 
issues at trial. After the Court had twice unsuccessfully ordered Mr. Fuell to provide his 
income information, Lorencita's efforts to gain the necessary information included a 
formal discovery request, followed by a Motion to Compel, followed by a Motion in 
Limine when Mr. Fuell continued to refuse to provide the information as ordered. The 
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only relevant information ever received from Mr. Fuell was a single pay stub that arrived 
after the last pretrial conference and even that was never indicated as a trial exhibit by 
Mr. Fuell as he never filed any witness or exhibit lists prior to trial. (00105 -107,1J1-11, 
15) 
Willfully hiding your financial information until after the Court has ordered that it 
not be introduced at trial and then crying you were not able to produce rebuttal 
evidence is not "trial by ambush" by any definition, nor an err by the trial court. 
The trial court did not err in holding Mr. Fuell was voluntarily underemployed as 
the court made very adequate findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the 
imputation pursuant to UCA 78B-12-203. (127 - 128) 
Adequacy of Findings Not Challenged in Trial Court 
Mr. Fuell failed to challenge the adequacy of the court's factual findings in the 
trial court. The statement on page 5 of the Appellant's Brief, "In order to evaluate the 
merit of appellant's first imputation argument, we must determine whether the trial 
court's decision to impute income was supported by adequate findings in light of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) . . ." demands that in order to preserve his appeal to 
this Court, Mr. Fuell must have challenged the adequacy of the court's factual findings 
in the trial Court as discussed in detail above. 
Because Mr. Fuell failed to make the required challenge in the trial court, the 
appeal on this issue must be denied. 
Failed to Marshal Facts on Appeal 
As discussed in detail above, to convince this Court to overturn the trial court's 
decision, Mr. Fuell must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
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demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be clearly erroneous. 
The court's decision to impute income was adequately supported by sufficient 
evidence. On the issue of voluntary change of jobs, Mr. Fuell produced no 
documentary evidence and no testimony other than his own to support any of his claims 
of medical problems that might have precluded his continued employment at this former 
job and income. Mr. Fuell did respond to his attorney's leading question "So am I 
correct that you also changed your jobs because it was recommended by your doctor?" 
with the statement 'They just recommended a lifestyle change" (00156 Pg 42 Ln 5-7) 
He die indicate that he was having trouble sleeping because of the shift work, but also 
stated that he refused to take any medications that might help with this problem. 
(00156 Pg 38 Ln 17-25) That was the total sum and body of all medically oriented 
evidence presented by Mr. Fuell at trial concerning his physical inability to continue his 
historical employment. 
In response to a second leading question from his attorney, Mr. Fuell also stated 
that"/ changed jobs - - / didn't want to wait five years after I graduated to look for the 
employment that I took my school for and it had already been three years since I 
graduated, [from Heating and Air Conditioning school] (00156 Pg 45 Ln 3-15) 
Mr. Fuell went on to testify that at the time he was served the petition to modify, 
he had been historically making $20.80 base pay plus night shift differential, Sunday 
premiums and eight hours of overtime every two weeks. (00156 Pg 44 Ln 16 - Pg 45 Ln 
2) He also testified that nine months after he was served the petition to modify his 
income was reduced to $14.00 per hour at his new job. (00156 Pg 46 Ln 4-7) 
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Even with nothing other than Mr. Fuell's testimony, the court clearly had 
adequate evidence before it to determine the facts concerning Mr. Fuell's income 
history at his prior employment and his then current employment. Given this evidence 
coupled with Mr. Fuell's evasive testimony, the court made the reasonable finding of 
underemployment, which had been freely admitted by Mr. Fuell as having been 
voluntary. 
Mr. Fuell's charge that the Respondent nor her attorney presented any evidence 
that Petitioner was voluntarily underemployed is not quite correct when considering the 
Petitioner's own testimony that his doctor did not recommend that Mr. Fuell change 
jobs, but rather the doctor "just recommended a lifestyle change" (00156 Pg 42 Ln 5-7) 
Mr. Fuell was not fired or laid off from his historical job where he earned more 
than $20.80 (00156 Pg 44 Ln 16- Pg 45 Ln 2), but rather Mr. Fuell testified, although he 
had already been out of a trade school for three years, soon after he was served the 
petition to modify, he decided to change to a $14.00 per hour job because he didn't 
want to wait five years after he graduated. (00156 Pg 45 Ln 3 -15 - Pg 46 Ln 4-7) 
The claim by Mr. Fuell on page 20 of his Summary of the Argument, that the 
court required Mr. Fuell to essentially disprove Lorencita's allegation of voluntary 
underemployment rather than requiring her to provide competent evidence of his 
employment condition completely misses the mark of the basic mission of any trial 
court, that being the process of finding the truth of a given matter and then applying the 
law to the facts established thereby, regardless of which party testifies as to those facts 
For Mr. Fuell's attorney to argue in his brief that his client was not providing "competent 
evidence" when testifying under oath can only mean that Mr. Fuell's attorney 
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disbelieves his own client's sworn testimony. Be that as it may, the trial court was 
clearly within its discretion to believe that Mr. Fuell told the truth concerning his 
employment situation thereby providing competent evidence upon which the court could 
properly base its decision to find voluntary underemployment as a basis to impute 
income to Mr. Fuell. 
The argument made in the first paragraph on page 21 of Mr. Fuell's brief and 
again on the last half of page 27, that "the only evidentiary basis provided by the trial 
court in imputing income based on voluntary underemployment was that Mr. Fuell 
changed jobs" is absurd and intentionally misleading. Rather than marshal the ample 
evidence available in the trial record, that argument completely ignores the sworn 
testimony of Mr. Fuell that his voluntary change in employment reduced his income 
from the $20.80 base pay plus night shift differential, Sunday premiums and eight hours 
of overtime every two weeks that he had historically been making to $14.00 per hour at 
his new job. (00156 Pg 44 Ln 16 - Pg 45 Ln 2) 
That argument also completely ignores the court's finding in its Memorandum 
Decision that Mr. Fuel was earning $4,825 per month until he decided he needed a 
lifestyle change and took a new job earning $2,427 per month. (00139) 
Likewise, the unsupported argument on page 22 of Mr. Fuell's brief, that Mr. 
Fuell's change of employment "was for the benefit of his children" and the argument on 
page 24-25, that it would not be logical for Mr. Fuell to earn less money so he would not 
have to pay more child support completely belies the often demonstrated non-custodial 
parent's willingness to do exactly that. 
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If that were not true, there would be no need for a statutory definition of voluntary 
unemployment or voluntary underemployment. The fact that UCA 78B-12-203 has 
been created by the Utah legislature gives life to the fact that other parents, like Mr. 
Fuell, have made the decision to eliminate or reduce their income so they could pay 
less to support their children and/or former spouse. 
Ill polar and direct opposition to the argument Mr. Fuell makes above, on page 
29 of his brief he cites Griffith v. Griffith 959 P.2d, 1015,1018 to provide the judicial 
explanation of the goal of imputing income to prevent parents from reducing their 
support obligations by purposeful underemployment. Had Mr. Fuell read the Griffith 
case he was citing to, it would be inconceivable that he could continue to make the 
argument in his brief that no parent could or would ever do such a thing to their family. 
Mr. Fuell tries to convince this Court that based upon Griffith v. Griffith, the trial 
court was required to find that his underemployment was "purposefur and then goes on 
to claims his was not "purposeful" underemployment and he should therefore prevail on 
appeal. However, the law in Utah does not require a finding of purposeful 
underemployment, but rather, in Utah before a court imputes income to a parent, UCA 
78B-12-203 requires a finding of exactly what the trial court did find, voluntary 
underemployment. (00127-128) 
Filially, Mr. Fuell's citation to Burningham v. Oft, 525 P.2d 620 to support the 
contention that "a trial is not to be by ambush. Instead the evidence upon which one 
relies for judgment can be and should be known to the opponent" after he actively and 
adamantly refused to provide any evidence whatsoever to Lorencita for the 15 months 
immediately preceding trial and then complained when the exhibits he wanted to 
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produce for the very first time at trial were rejected by the court, completely summarizes 
the total lack of candor and respect Mr. Fuell has shown to the judicial system from the 
first day he filed his divorce complaint containing false income information through the 
very last page of his appellant's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fuell's demand that this Court reverse the imputation of income to him for 
the calculation of his child support obligation is simply not supported by his brief and 
therefore, must be denied. 
As demonstrated above, first Mr. Fuell failed in his obligation to challenge the 
findings in the trial court. Then he filed an untimely appeal. Then in his appellant's 
brief, Mr. Fuell failed to marshal the evidence as required by the rules. This is a three 
strike situation where his appeal must be declared to be OUT. 
REQUEST FOR COSTS 
Lorencita Diel has been subject to the emotional and personal financial costs of 
this action for more than two years. She has been required to expend substantial 
amounts in costs and attorney's fees in order to conduct the trial and again now to 
respond to this untimely and groundless appeal. The claim that the demand for 
imputation of income was not included in the petition to modify, even though Mr. Fuell 
did not reduce his income until nine months after the petition was served upon him 
(00156 Pg 81 Ln 1-11) is typical of the less than honest approach taken by Mr. Fuell 
through out this entire divorce action, beginning with the false information about his 
income stated in his complaint that was carried over into the divorce decree. 
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The statement in the full paragraph on page 13 of his brief that Mr. Fuell was 
"advised to seek different employment by his doctors due to stress and that he 
completed an educational program to become a HVAC technician" is another example 
of the intentional misrepresentation of the facts of this case made in his brief as 
contrasted by the statements he actually made under oath, those being Q." So am I 
correct that you also changed your jobs because it was recommended by your doctor?" 
A. "They just recommended a lifestyle change" (00156 Pg 42 Ln 5-7) and 7 changed 
jobs - - / didn't want to wait five years after I graduated to look for the employment that I 
took my school for and it had already been three years since I graduated, [from Heating 
and Air Conditioning school] (00156 Pg 45 Ln 3-15) 
Hr. Fuell's false claim that the only evidentiary basis used by the trial court in 
imputing income was that "Mr. Fuell changed jobs" is again typical of the intentional 
misrepresentations made throughout this action thereby greatly increasing the length 
and cost of the litigation to Lorencita. 
Were this devious activity presented in the trial court, there is little doubt that the 
evidence would be sufficient for the court to award Lorencita the fees and costs she 
incurred solely because Mr. Fuell's defense was totally lacking in merit. 
Therefore, Lorencita Diel asks this Court to award her the costs and legal fees 
she has incurred in responding to this appeal in the minimum amount of $5,165.00. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS 19th Day October 2009. 
Gary Buhler ~ 
Attorney for Lorencita J. Diel, Appellee 
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